I visited the Kuje Prison for the first time yesterday to see for myself the scene of the attack and somehow put myself in the mind of the attackers in a kind of playback.
I wanted to also see if I could identify some factors that might have contributed to the seeming ease with which the attack was carried out and assess how existing security measures in Kuje compare with what should be the standard for a facility of similar standing.
ABOUT KUJE PRISON
a. It is classified as a Medium Security (MS) prison meaning it is supposed to hold inmates whose escape would pose just moderate risk to the community and/or inmates with a moderate capacity to break jail. (BH/ISWAP/Ansaru terrorist is high risk and should be in MS)
b. Kuje is designed to hold 560 inmates maximum but at the time of the attack was holding some 1000 inmates ie less supervision.
c. The main access road leading to the main gate is covered by trees and overgrown bushes such that one’s approach is effectively covered from the sight of sentries at the gate even in daylight not to say night.
d. The outer perimeter wall is just about 6-7ft high as against recommended height of 8-15 ft.
e. Only one or two coils of razor wire placed on top of perimeter wall against recommended 3 coils one on top of the other.
f. No second inner fence line once you are over the first perimeter wall you’re through. Prison buildings should have outer and inner fence lines with a clear zone of at least 10 yards in between.
g. The walls of the prison (which attackers broke) are of ordinary cement and block instead of recommended 4-inch thick reinforced concrete wall or precast
h. There are two observation towers but not high enough with a line of sight covered by trees and thick bushes. Additionally being positioned deep inside the building instead of by the outer perimeter wall the observation towers cannot serve the intended purpose which is to be able to sight /engage with fire, and intruders far off before they even reach the outer perimeter or raise alarm.
i. A few CCTV cameras on the towers (dunno if working) but such CCTV should have been on the outer approaches.
j. I observed a few fixed stationery security lights around bt preferably movable lights that are wired to motion sensors so that they come on & point to the area of intrusion. I confirm the light was off during op which could be a normal power outage, deliberate action or no standby power.
k. On site Response force (according to an NCS official who briefed the press) is supposed to comprise 38 militaries, some unspecified police and civil defence and armed correctional service personnel but no clarity if these were on the ground on a particular day. Conflicting testimonies
l. The absence of any wounded or dead attacker left behind lends credence to the claim that all the armed defenders ran away without returning effective fire.
m. Facing outside from inside the prison, the left, right, and front are all covered by thick grasses, bushes & a deep ravine valley to the right from which 1 could approach the prison completely unobserved, especially at night. The attackers came on foot via the valley to the right
n. The fact that attackers operated for between 1-3 hours (depending on the source) and again left on foot without the defenders mounting a counterattack (after recovering from initial surprise), the fact that a divisional police station I sighted 2.5 km away couldn’t provide reinforcements, means there was no any contingency plan in place.
o. Mixing dangerous BHT inmates who ought to be in a maximum security prison with detained less dangerous politicians (Nyame Dariye Lawan Kyari) in the same prison was against the recommended practice for prison security of categorization and allocation of inmates and probably endangered the less dangerous politicians the attackers could have shot them just for the fun of it or abducted them
